

## **By meeting the other we can value the difference**

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Cultural differences can create insuperable distances. The political system and the media do not though help to meet cultures foreign to our own. Often migrants are structured with denigrating terms which are related to their ethnic origins and serve to distance by unifying one construct to define the other. This paper analyses migrants' conditions in Italy, especially foreign carers' conditions. These new workers live in families where they required provide help for disabled or elderly people.

### **By meeting the other**

Suppose we were walking in a foreign forest and we happened to bump into natives, who do not speak our language. Can we communicate with them by using language? No. We will try to observe them, to look for indications of their "emotions" (happiness, anger, etc.) to discriminate some action or attitude that we might distinguish using the dimensions of meaning that make up our own system of constructs. As an assumption the Fundamental Postulate (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 32/1991): a person's processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events: the constructs change so our "The constructs become the " axes of references we place the events of our life" (Epting, 1984) and we give them meaning. Therefore we try to anticipate by observing the others, trying to understand "expectancy system" (Kelly, 1955, p. 804) that they deal with.

As Maturana and Varela (1984), state " all knowledge depends on its own structure of knowing" and so it does not correspond to a passive perception of what has "happened" ontologically.

Kelly (1955/1991, vol. 1., p. 35), affirms how a person "erects a structure, within the framework of which the substance takes shape or assumes meaning. The substance which he/she construes does not produce the structure; the person does". This implies that "every one of us looks at their situation through the glasses of our construct system" (Bannister e Fransella, 1971, p.31) from which we are part, also of the superordinate constructs of our own culture. We could meet the other like Robinson Crusoe, or in a different way, like Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca.

We could meet someone like Robinson Crusoe, the sole survivor of a shipwreck, who lived on a desert island for 28 years, off the coast of America, near the mouth of the great river, the Orinoco. (Defoe, 1719, 1972). When he finishes his work, Crusoe is always the same, having earned a lot of money through his plantations across the ocean, but is he able to understand the people that he meets? Are his systems of constructs modified when he meets someone? Has he completed his cycle of experience (Epting, 1984)? Is he locked into his rigid framework of meaning or has he allowed new elements to

enter this framework delineating new directions of movement?

Let us analyse what happens when Crusoe meets Friday on the island. Crusoe's anticipation of Friday is based on his construction of "black", which defines what and how he thinks of the native. For Crusoe to meet Friday is to stop at a point of his anticipation in the cycle of experience. This is to use a pre-emptive and constellatory construction of a native (Kelly, 1955) : so Friday, is not the other and cannot be anything but "black". Crusoe has difficulty in considering him an equal person, it seems he, Friday, is structured as the constructs of "friend-wild" and "slave-cannibal". We can hypothesize, also, how the constructs of "person", "social convention", "values", were, in Crusoe, to a limited extent permeable, hindering him to form new constructs of experience. (Kelly, 1955, pp. 77-81). As Bannister e Fransella (1971) states " stereotypical descriptions (...) become a prescription". The criterion is primarily based on Western values being superior to any others, or those belonging to someone with a different skin colour, or who is construed as backward and less civilized. So it follows the Crusoe teaches Friday, and Friday is in the humble position of being a student. It is inconceivable that Friday could have anything to teach Crusoe.

According to Crusoe it is absolutely necessary that Friday learn these values to become "civilized".

These values had a functional purpose in a complex Western culture but on a desert island they prevent Crusoe from recognising other value systems so much so that when he does encounter the other (for example Friday) he remains tightly anchored to his system of meanings.: "he does not perform experiments; he tries only to stage demonstrations. He does not try to discover what is right; he seeks only to prove that he was right in the first place" (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 2, pag. 403). He is predisposed to meet a transition of hostility. Kelly For what reasons is Crusoe unable to modify his constructs?

Crusoe makes the continued effort to extort validation evidence in favour of a type of social prediction which has already proved itself a failure (Kelly, 1955/1991, p. 375), That is, Friday cannot have knowledge, competence and elaborative dimensions of meaning for the context that constitutes the island. Hostility does not permit knowledge of the other, to meet him/her. It involves instead remaining anchored to one's own anticipation and structuring (instead of constructing) the other. Like the myth of Procastus cited by Kelly (1957/1969), Crusoe try of "alters events until he makes them fit his original view" (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 376).

We think instead of other travellers around 1500-1600.

Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca (1542, 1989), the official of the Spanish fleet, who started his voyage with the anticipations of the conquistadores. They left Spain with five ships carrying 600 men. After a year meeting of Indian tribes, facing illness and famine, hurricanes and deserters, Nunez was left only with just three other men.

The adventure for Nunez and three other men start here, in the moment that our constructions became meet and invalidation. The man who had set out to conquer the Indios was himself conquered by them. The conqueror becomes the conquered. Seven years later, and an infinity of leagues away, when he once more finds himself facing the Spaniards, this time on the Pacific coast, it is "they" whom Alvar Nunez identifies as "them"; the Christians whose cruelty towards "us" (the Indios) he denounces.

What's happen to Alvar Nunez? He changes his skin.

As Jankowicz (2003) says, "to the extent that people in different cultures understand the world differently, *he* must expend deliberate effort in trying to come to terms with each other's meanings".

In the new world Nunez probably experiences transitions of anxiety due to his "awareness that the events which he faces lie mostly outside the range of convenience of his construct system, " (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 495); there are also transitions of surprise meaning that he experiences "a sudden

awareness of a need to construe events” (McCoy, 1977).

Contrary to Crusoe, Nunez uses a propositional way to construe the Natives (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol.1, p.119). He is aware that the fact that they are Natives does not exclude the possibility of their being other.

Nunez manages to render his constructs of “catholic” and “person” permeable (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, pp. 55-57), so as to embrace those indios he encounters during his travels. He aggressively elaborates his field of perception (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 374) that is to say, as Epting (1984) writes “ he attempts to build up a structure suited to the events that lie outside his field of understanding ”.

In his encounters with the Indigenous peoples “(...) he tries to make sense of the system of sense-construction of the other; he does not try to frame it in terms of his own categories or insist that it be judged on the basis of that which strictly adheres to some social norm” (Mair, 1998 p27). To the extent to which it construes the natives’ processes of construction, it may therefore play an important role in some social process that involves the natives themselves (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p.66). Thus, Nunez meets the Indigenous people and undergoes a change. He sees them as people with whom he can share experiences. The Indios then help him to become a Shaman.

This movement towards the other allows Nunez and the Indians to co-construe a new shamanic rite, sharing language and common duties (e.g. healing). During these shamanic rites shared with the Indians, Nunez uses Catholic prayers. He revises them to his constructs of “prayer” and “ Religion”, thanks to the new cycle of experience and creativity (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, pp. 388-389).

He goes beyond the cultural constructs of his native land. By moving in the direction of increasing propositionally Nunez is able to achieve a loosening and to extend the area of pertinence of his constructs. So he discovers that he can use his own system of constructs in a creative manner so as to make sense of the novel events that he encounters in his travels. Nunez becomes an experimenter of himself and he undertakes a voyage of self-reflection, which will continue for the rest of his life.

Thus he succeeds in including in “we” that which had previously been simply “other”. So it is that this journey becomes an opportunity to revise Nunez’s own constructs.

Alvarez Nunez is a figure that can still provide us with food for thought despite the fact that he lived five hundred years ago. He manages to elaborate a construction of experience similar to that of the Indios (Kelly 1955, p 90) and at the same time, to play the role of a “participant” and not only an “observer” (Kelly, 1955, p. 98).

In terms of the Psychology of Personal Constructs, culture is characterised not only by a similarity or dissimilarity of behaviour but by a commonly shared construct of experience (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 66). As Scheer and Walker (2003) specify, shared constructions are possible because people who belong to a given group are similar in what they expect of one another, and similar in their perceptions of what is expected of them.

As Nunez’s experience reveals, from the perspective of which the other is construed as a person, like me, “a legitimate coexistence” (Maturana, Verden-Zoller, 1993), the meeting becomes a shared dance. (Telfner, in von Foerster, 1987). In this dance, according to the adage of von Foerster, the “dancers” are always looking for new meanings and harmonies. However these meanings are rarely to be found in the constructs of the migratory phenomena characteristic of many countries, including Italy.

Working as a psychologist in Italy, in association with Culture Amiche (a listening-point), talking migrants who often speak of the awareness of feeling alienated in both the host country as well as their homeland. Migrants exist in a state of an uncertain and permeable identity both in the host country and in their native land when they return home. In both cases they are forced to continue to invalidate and revise their anticipations.

Benson (2001) suggested that “ people make meaningful the world they find, make meaningful worlds and in the course of doing all these things construct themselves as types of person and self who inhabit these worlds”. Cummins (p. 240, 2003), starting from this perspective, describes his own experience as

migrant and points out that one knows himself through ((non so qui se affirmations o claims)) which however become questions when they are constructively revised.

Which, however, in some moment became question. These include for instance:

“Where you are (?)“Where you have been (?)”, “Where do you hope to arrive (?)”.

Anthropologists refer to the growing number of people who migrate across different countries to focus on "global and transnational identities" (Kearney, 1995).

Walker has suggested that cross-cultural travelling may lead to an extension of a person's identity – including personal development – but that may be accompanied by consolidation of identity –(...). Such changes, however, may also be a painful experience.

This can be applied to a much greater degree to migrants, because of their vital necessity to consolidate one's identity or system of core constructs". They are often required to alternatively construct two different poles, which correspond to two different cultures: their "native" culture and the "host" culture. They construct themselves through: “«fragmented selves», where a fragmented self is defined as a set of incompatible subsystem” (Cummins, 2003, p. 143). So migrant has the self that is for example, “pure Rumanian or Ukrainian”, the Italianized self and the “self that attempts to integrate the previous two”. The question is of course what is the cost of this fragmentation (Cummins, 2003,p.143).

A person's social identity at any time is a function of his or her validated social positions. This means that we are constantly faced with the necessity of locating ourselves in relation to others. (Cummins, 2003, p.145).

### **What is meant in Italy by the terms “immigrant” and “migrant?”**

There exist current definitions like “immigrants”, or the pseudo-juridical neologism “Non-EU-Community Person” or the more generic “foreigner”. Can these labels define the complex conditions of migrants in the rich North of the world (Italy included)?

An “immigrant” is s foreigner who is not a member of the EU. He/she is, above all a Person seeking work who comes from a country which is subordinate in the international division, both economical and political, of labour.

As Dal Lagos (2005) writes, in Italy, the term “migrant” pertinently describes the condition of the subjects who abandon their national spaces, while the term “immigrant” refers to the way in which our affluent societies treat and label them.

When we speak of immigrants we are speaking about the relationship between them and us. As already stated the observer is always a part of what he/she observes. In fact any description ...implicates always the describer (Maturana e Varela, 1984).

Sayad (2002) Speaking of “the mirror function of migratory phenomena” shows how we can understand the construct of “immigrant” “...it helps to render clear that which was latent in the construction and functioning of a social order, to unmask what was masked, (...) to bring to light or magnify (the mirror effect) what was habitually hidden at a very low level of awareness ” (Sayad 2002) and thus destined to remain in the shadows at a low level of awareness or social thought. Through a process of constriction in fact all doubts and questions are abolished. Turning a blind eye is a choice, a possibility (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 45/1991) that allows one to “minimize the apparent incompatibility of one's construction system by drawing in the outer boundaries of one's perceptual field” (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p.352/1991). To construe this as a choice constitutes a warning with respect to each person's individual responsibility “...choosing in a rational way (know-that) or following our know-how, in both cases we are choosing, taking responsibility for this” (Giliberto, 2009, p. 7).

Kelly (1955/1991, vol. 1, pp. 124/1991), also stresses the fact that “group expectancies operate as validators of personal constructs”; research of this kind can recursively favour “an attitude of rejection or hostility towards an individual belonging to a certain group simply for the fact that he is part of that group and is considered to possess the negative characteristics attributed to that group (Allport, 1954)”. Therefore an understanding of the immigration phenomenon reveals the cultural constructs of our society for “it tells us something about the relationship that is established between those who are “inside” a society (with all the sense of security that this entails) and those who, coming from “the outside”, demand to “enter”” (Dal Lago, 2005, p.18).

The categories by means of which we construct our reality are channelled by the cultural constructs of the context we are a part of since it is “the “culture” that specifies the co-superordinate according to which the actions of the individual are primarily constructed, determining in turn the “ideal” characteristics of his/her personality” (Bannister and Fransella, 1980, p.118). Kelly in fact posits the existence of “cultural controls” (1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 126/1991): the person “is not merely the product of his culture, but it has undoubtedly provided him with much evidence of what is ‘true’ and much of the data which his personal construct system has had to keep in systematic order” (1955/1991, vol. 2, p. 92/1991).

The media and government policy in Italy often contribute to the creation of “culture-dictated constructs”, in which the migrant is a one-dimensional figure prejudicially described and unfavourably compared to Italians. When this happens is the migrant seen as a Person, like our? (Giliberto in Armezzani et al., 2009) speaks of the “Criterion of the Person”, viewing it as the “awareness that we are a person only among other persons, in a relationship of reciprocal identity validation” Therefore it legitimizes the perception of the other as one who feels and lives, exploring the limits of an infinity of differences and seeing that person not as a mere *human being* but rather constructing him/her as a *Person*.

However, he continues, the status of *Person* seems to be completely embedded within cultural and moral traditions: we consider to be persons all Catholic brothers or Muslim brothers, white brothers or black brothers, people who live in the North or in the South. And even within these traditions the status of person appears to proceed in fits and starts, through a series of internal boundaries: some *persons* are more *person* than others. For example, in certain cultural systems women (no matter how much importance is attributed to them) seem to enjoy lower status than men. In short, those who find themselves outside certain boundaries are “others” or, worse still, “other things”, depersonalised human beings (Armezzani et al., 2009). “Along the entire length of these confines ethics are slain and human beings are robbed of their status of persons. Here we enter the domain of savagery, of war but also of the banal, everyday evil that permeates our days when we forget that before us there stands a person (Armezzani et al., 2009).

The modalities of the reigning constructions in which intolerance sinks its roots are those that ignore or discredit the personal and cultural identities of others; the others’ traditions and values. Researchers who risk accentuating resentment towards specific persons or groups or towards the traditions of immigrants help to generate transitions of hostility: they wring validating evidence from the data to serve their own prejudices and they deny the validity of sources that do not confirm their findings (Bannister e Fransella, 1980, p.129).

One of the most underhanded forms of this hostility consists of taking it for granted that the only correct and legitimate system of values and meanings is our own system and demanding that others accept it unquestioningly.

Stephen Greenblatt (1991) has written a fascinating book about this type of invalidation of the other as a *Person*. With the arrival of Columbus in the America we witness how quickly the initial admiration of the Europeans at the sight of the wonders of the New World translated into its total destruction. Like

many other explorers who followed him, Columbus is convinced that he understands the language and the intentions of the native population, whereas in fact he is separated from them by an immeasurable gulf. There is no common ground between Columbus and the Arawaks but this does not worry him; even though he does not comprehend their language he knows that they want to make him a gift of all they possess. Columbus continues to extort validating evidence favouring his own system of meanings: as Bannister and Fransella (1980) write, “he suspends contrasting elements and thus he is able to maintain his original preconceived views”. Is it possible to speak of a meeting in a situation where the other is not considered to be a Person, is not considered to have rights, as happened in the scene of the taking of possession by Columbus from the Indios?

The other path, the one that our history has so far rarely taken in its encounters with other cultures, departs from the crossroads where we left Columbus on October 14th. 1492. He took the road that led him to ignore the traditions, the language the basic rights of the other. Now we must take the other way and choose to “admit that our point of view is the result of a structural union in a domain of experience that is every bit as valid as that of our interlocutor even if his/her viewpoint strikes us as less desirable. It remains for us to seek a broader perspective, a domain of experience within which the other has a place and in which we can construct a world with him/her” (Maturana and Varela, 1984). In this way we will be able to appreciate the true value of the culture, the identity and the way of thinking of the other.

## **FEMALE MIGRATION**

Who, then, are the immigrants with whom, more and more often, we find ourselves living in Italy?

Let us consider the phenomenon of so-called (in Italian) “badantato”. “Badante” (from the Italian verb “badare”, in English, “to look after” “to take care of”) may be translated into English as “carer” or “care-giver”. However, the word constitutes a specific verbal label or tag that, in Italy, tends to refer to a carer of foreign nationality. Some carers may however be Italians but in this case there is a kind of contract that is usually different to the contracts offered to foreigners; eight hours a day, not twenty or more.

By “care-giver” we intend the series of activities carried out to assist in the everyday needs of an elderly person who is ill or else wholly or partially non-autonomous. Such a person’s needs grow more numerous due to his/her being unable to carry out most of these activities without help. Many of these needs pertain to the sphere of personal self-sufficiency, which is often severely impaired (Murdaca, 2009, p. 30).

Professional care giving originates in an international context that witnesses an ever-increasing stream of work forces and labour flowing from poorer to richer countries.

About half of this migrant population are women, who, as never before in history began to move and enter in ever-greater numbers into the world labour market “which offers them an occupational niche. In the main they find jobs as domestics or care-givers; these positions are often ill-paid, offer few career prospects and little in the way of personal realisation” (Chiaretti, 2005).

The new demand for services also corresponds the a need to attend to domestic and caring activities that used to be carried out by women in so-called “rich countries” who have now entered the world of work and are unable to carry out these duties, These immigrants contribute to the formation of a new category of invisible workers, devoid of bargaining power, as quite often no contract is drawn up. According to Saskia Sassen (2004) this is a new “serving class” which emerges and increases within the confines of the so-called informal economy that is to say that series of transactions in goods and services that do not appear in the accounts of either the national economy or the fiscal authorities.

It is in this sector, more than in others, that there is a demand for a flexible, low-cost workforce deprived of all rights. To be a caregiver often means not to be recognized as a *Person*, a *Person*

endowed with the right to cultivate his/her own interests, friends and to dispose of his/her free time. Often the caregivers who talk to me have bitter observations to make: "this work is a new form of slavery. We were sure that in Italy we would have a secure job, be able to help the families we would be working for and, especially, we would be well paid; you think you're arriving in a world of respect, a democratic world...and then you work 22 hours a day with no guarantee that you'll have Saturday or Sunday off". Within the epistemological/theoretical framework of the Psychology of Personal Constructs we may speak of repeated invalidations of the expectations of these migrants. Olga, a 55-year-old Ukrainian woman had worked as an architect in her home country.

She was forced to leave the Ukraine following the 1991 economic crisis when she found herself out of a job, with two young children and an unemployed husband with a drinking problem. Olga's expectations were linked to the possibility of being able to practice her profession in a country where it would be appreciated and where her competence and her professional skills would be validated. Olga had entered the phase of investment in her cycle of experience, willing to re-distribute part of her dependence and to build up new role relationships when she moved from the Ukraine to city in Italy. However, in Italy, she was unable to find employment as an architect and so she ended up adding to the ranks of the "carers".

What happens, then, at the moment of encounter between a migrant and a native, an encounter that, in many cases in Italy, takes place in a so-called "temporary" centre of permanence? Investigative journalists of every ideological or political stripe are unable to conceal the dehumanising conditions that prevail in these centres of permanence in which there is a distancing from the construct of the migrant as a "Person". It becomes impossible to include in the constructs of "Person" and "life" elements such as the images of confinement and degradation coming out of what are, in effect, concentration camps where often people remain for months not knowing what fate awaits them.

After odysseys of this kind or, in more fortunate cases, after a simple airplane flight-as was the case with Olga- migrants find themselves in a geographical and cultural environment totally different to those in their country of origin and to the migrant's own expectations for which reason they frequently experience an anxiety transition (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 365/1991). The micro-worlds of Olga's experience are frequently unknown. "At times the break-downs become macroscopic (...) For example, when we enter a foreign country for the first time, there is huge lack of ready-for-action and recurrent micro-worlds" (Varela 1992).

Olga finds herself having to face anxiety transitions with respect to totally unforeseen event such as the language, customs, smells, colours and attitudes of the people she encounters. In addition she was obliged to go through a lengthy process of revision of her core construct as an architect. In a few short months, what appears to us to be a lucky position as a carer, was for her "...an hell, I find myself living a life that is not mine and as a minder experiences relationships in a house where I'm looked on like a labourer, or less; I haven't even got a common worker's rights. My employer can let me go any time he likes and then how am I to renew my residence permit?"

The migrant carer experiences a broad all-inclusive invalidation of certain core constructs. Migrant carers like Olga experience a wide-ranging and comprehensive invalidation of other core constructs as well; for example the chance to be recognized as a "citizen" rather than an "illegal immigrant") So, who is Olga? Who are migrants? What are the effects of living within a different national identity?

As Cummins (2003) suggests, Ravenette's model of boundaries (in Fisher and Cornelius 2001) may contribute to the understanding of Olga's much-debated condition as well as that of migrants in general, not to mention the dilemma within which they move Ravenette's model utilizes two constructs: "legitimate vs. illegitimate" and "safety vs. danger". In adopting an identity, Olga can choose to try to "become Italian". This would be illegitimate but safe (as long as she's not discovered!). To proudly assert her Ukrainian identity is legitimate but dangerous (for the risk of rejection). She could decide to live solely within a Ukrainian community (which would be seen by the host community

as illegitimate but safe) or finally she can refuse to be anything but totally Ukrainian in the wider community (illegitimate and dangerous). Ravenette's model can help us to see that there is no one adequate answers to Olga's (or any migrant's) dilemma.

Olga can be considered as being continuously engaged in construing her personal construct sense, looking for differences and similarities. As Walker (2000, 2002b) writes, "what begins as mere observation leads to the attachment of meaning and from there to the confirmation of identity".

Let us now try to observe the situation, as Kelly writes (1955/1991, vol. 2, p.421/1991), with the "readiness to see the world through another person's eyes", in other words through the eyes of a family which employs a care-giver or minder.

Members of the family may encounter an anxiety transition (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 365/1991). In their eyes, the "care-giver" is an extraneous person about whom "after all we know so little"; a person who nevertheless becomes an important element in their constructs of dependence and those of the people whom the "carer" cares for.

In the relationship between "care-giver" and "family" speaking different languages, there are problems of translation and difficulties of mutual understanding. "As Kelly points out, the degree to which we can relate to the other depends on how well we understand that other persons view of the world" (Cummins, 2003).

In fact, Kelly (1962, pp. 93-93) cited by Davidson (year of publication???) describes "a particular cultural-national construct by reference to "community behaviour", that is to say, the forms of behaviour that are either articulated outright by group consensus or simply perpetuated by tacit compliance".

Within the relationship between a carer and a family the presence of diverse "different cultural backgrounds" – constructs derived from what Kelly calls (Kelly, 1955, p. 179), -- runs the risk of limiting the construction of role relationships, or even of preventing them from forming.

The other could be construing in a pre-emptive way – only similar and not different (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p.107/1991) and not otherwise elaborated.

This involves not going beyond the cultural differences and domestic employment: you are nothing but a care-giver, a woman whose duty it is to care for someone, you are nothing outside of the job you are required to do.

As Bannister and Fransella (1980) write, if we do not understand other persons, if we are not able to construe their constructions, "then we can do things to them but we cannot relate to them".

The migrant is often a mere figure dedicated to satisfying a dependency, rather than a Person with a role to play as defined by Kelly (1955/1991, vol.1, p.68/1991).

When the others are "need fulfillers" (Giliberto, 2009), our construction of "Person" risks being a very narrow one in which those who lie outside of it become something less than "human". "The scalar ways in which human beings have defined the borders between persons and things are numerous. Sometimes they are clear, sometimes they are more or less invisible" (Giliberto, 2009).

It is our responsibility to throw light on the boundaries beyond which the other loses the status of person and to prevent this happening

## **Conclusions**

We have seen, unfortunately, how often encounters occur between people belonging to different cultures. What alternatives might there be?

Segall (1979) shows that "(...) any single culture's classification system should first be expressed in

the terms employed indigenously. And it is that system, after all, that makes up the cognitive map of the person in that culture. (...) To understand why a people think the way they do, we must first appreciate how they think". And for that we must discover how people make sense of things.

Furthermore "... personal construct psychology is not only about persons as construers, but also about the interpersonal, or social, worlds in relation to which all instances of construing are attempts at making meaning or sense. (Graham Davidson, Reser,p-106) "

Meeting the other means transforming both oneself and the other, recognizing and construing one another's peculiarities and not falling into the "fundamentalism of 'more equal to me' (Giliberto, in Armezzani et al., 2009). As Chiari (in Nuzzo, 2002) writes "the conclusion to which this prospect leads to is not, as one might suppose, that "everything is relative" but rather "everything is relations"; everything emerges and undergoes change in the relationship of a living system with the ambient which may well be represented by other people".

In this sense personal Construct Psychology can be construed as providing methods for promoting egalitarianism not only in the meeting of the psychotherapist and the client, but also in the meetings of social groups. Awareness of the pervasiveness of social constructions and of their effects are of the utmost importance (Scheer and Walker, 2003).

So the assumption of constructive alternativism (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 11/1991) provides for the possibility of finding constructs to replace those that are socially injurious. The corollary of sociality (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol.1, p.66/1991) furnishes another fundamental pre-supposition, a corner stone of every relationship ethically worthy of that name.

Encountering the other, then, implies a re-defining well-being in terms of human relationships, in which there is no supremacy, but rather mutual acceptance, since "it becomes a precondition to the intentional adoption of role relationships" (Kelly, 1955/1991, vol. 1, p. 277/1991).

As Cummins (2003) states, "the question of national and personal identity is one that can become highly politically charged". On the other hand "when Kelly was asked what area he would most like to see PCP being developed he replied «Politics»" (ibid.).

This work therefore represents a starting-point for further investigation the understanding of the meaning of living within a different national identity, in order to increase a personal political extension of the value of PCP.

Once again PCP shows itself to be a psychology of the other, a psychology of opportunities.

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